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Abstract
In May 2017, the Ogiek indigenous community of Kenya
successfully challenged the denial of their land and associ-
ated rights before the African Court of Human and Peoples
Rights (‘the Court’). In the first indigenous peoples’ rights
case considered the Court, and by far the largest ever case it
has had to consider, the Court found violations of Articles 1,
2, 8, 14, 17 (2) and (3), 21 and 22 of the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights (‘the African Charter’). It there-
fore created a major legal precedent. In addition, the litiga-
tion itself and Ogiek’s participation in the various stages of
the legal process provided a model for community engage-
ment, through which the Ogiek were empowered to better
understand and advocate for their rights. This article will
first explain the history of the case and the Court’s findings,
and then move on to examine in further detail methods
employed to build the Ogiek’s capacity throughout, and
even beyond, the litigation.
In May 2017, the Ogiek indigenous community of Ken-
ya successfully challenged the denial of their land and
associated rights before the African Court of Human
and Peoples’ Rights (‘the Court’). In the first indigenous
peoples’ rights case considered by the Court, and by far
the largest ever case it has had to consider, the Court
found violations of the Ogiek’s rights to freedom from
discrimination, to free practice of religion, to property,
to cultural life, to natural resources and to development
and other measures under the African Charter on
Human and Peoples’ Rights1 (‘the African Charter’).2 It
therefore created a major legal precedent. In addition,
the litigation itself and Ogiek’s participation in the vari-
ous stages of the legal process provided a model for
community engagement, through which the Ogiek were
empowered to better understand and advocate for their
rights. This article will first explain the history of the
case and the Court’s findings and then move on to
examine in further detail methods employed to build the
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1. Specifically, Arts. 2, 8, 14, 17(2) and (3), 21 and 22 of the Charter,
together with a violation of Art. 1 as a result of the Government of
Kenya failing to take legislative or other measures to protect these
rights.
2. ACHPR v. Kenya, App. no. 006/2012, judgment of African Court of
Human and Peoples’ Rights, issued 26 May 2017 (the ‘Ogiek judg-
ment’), available at: <http:// en. african -court. org/ images/ Cases/
Judgment/ Application%20006 -2012%20 -%20African%20Commission
%20on%20Human%20and%20Peoples%E2%80%99%20Rights
%20v. %20the%20Republic%20of%20Kenya. . pdf>.
Ogiek’s capacity throughout, and even beyond, the liti-
gation.
1 The Ogiek: A History of
Dispossession and
Marginalisation
The Ogiek, who number some 30,000,3 are some of
Africa’s last remaining forest dwellers. Traditionally
honey-gatherers, they survive mainly on wild fruits and
roots, game hunting and traditional beekeeping. The
Ogiek have lived since time immemorial in Kenya’s
Mau Forest and are the custodians of the environment
on which they depend. They have a unique way of life
well adapted to the forest. To them, the Mau Forest is a
home, school, cultural identity and way of life that pro-
vides the community with an essential sense of pride
and destiny. In fact, the term ‘Ogiek’ literally means
‘caretaker of all plants and wild animals’. Unsurprising-
ly, the survival of the ancient Mau Forest is therefore
inextricably linked with the survival of the Ogiek.
Since independence, and indeed prior to it, the Ogiek
have been routinely subjected to arbitrary forced evic-
tions from their ancestral land by the Kenyan Govern-
ment, without consultation or compensation. The
Ogiek’s rights over their traditionally owned lands have
been systematically denied and ignored. The Govern-
ment has allocated land to third parties, including politi-
cal allies, and permitted substantial commercial logging
to take place, without sharing any of the benefits with
the Ogiek. The eviction of the Ogiek from their ances-
tral land and the refusal to allow them access to their
spiritual home has prevented the Ogiek from practising
their traditional cultural and religious practices. The
culmination of all these actions has resulted in the Ogiek
being prevented from practising their traditional hunt-
er-gatherer way of life, thus threatening their very exis-
tence.
Over the last 50 years, the Ogiek have consistently
raised objections to these evictions with local and
national administrations, task forces and commissions
3. The Ogiek judgment refers to the Ogiek, comprising about 20,000
members (at para. 6), but a more accurate number is provided above
and as set out in para. 2 of the Applicant’s Submissions on the Merits,
available at: <http:// minorityrights. org/ wp -content/ uploads/ 2015/ 03/
Final -MRG -merits -submissions -pdf. pdf>.
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and have instituted several rounds of judicial proceed-
ings in the national courts, to no avail.
In October 2009, the Kenyan Government, through the
Kenya Forestry Service, issued a 30-day eviction notice
to the Ogiek and other settlers of the Mau Forest,
demanding that they leave the forest. Concerned that
this was a perpetuation of the historical land injustices
already suffered and having failed to resolve these injus-
tices through repeated national litigation and advocacy
efforts, the Ogiek decided to lodge a case against their
Government before the Commission,4 with the assis-
tance of Minority Rights Group International (MRG),
Ogiek Peoples’ Development Programme and Centre
for Minority Rights Development (CEMIRIDE).5 They
argued violations of their rights to property, natural
resources, religion, culture, development, life, freedom
from discrimination and equality, pursuant to the Afri-
can Charter, as a result of the treatment by the Kenyan
Government. In November 2009, the Commission, cit-
ing the far-reaching implications on the political, social
and economic survival of the Ogiek community and the
potential irreparable harm if the eviction notice was
actioned, issued an Order for Provisional Measures
requesting the Kenyan Government to suspend imple-
mentation of the eviction notice. The Ogiek were not
evicted on that occasion, but their precarious situation
continued. In early 2012, following the Kenyan Govern-
ment’s lack of response on the issue, the Commission
referred the case to the Court, and in July 2012, the
Court declared itself seized of the matter, pursuant to
Article 5(1)(a) of the Protocol.
On 15 March 2013, the Court issued an Order for Pro-
visional Measures, mirroring the order already issued by
the Commission, requiring the Kenyan Government to
(i) immediately reinstate the restrictions it had imposed
on land transactions in the Mau Forest Complex, and
(ii) refrain from any act/thing that would/might irrep-
arably prejudice the main application, until the Court
gives its final decision in the case. The Order was issued
as the Court considered that ‘there is a situation of
extreme gravity and urgency, as well as a risk of irrepar-
able harm to the [rights of the] Ogiek of the Mau For-
est’.6 This Order was, unfortunately, not complied with,
and evictions, harassment and intimidation of the Ogiek
have continued, including a violent eviction of approxi-
mately 1,000 Ogiek and police intimidation in March
2016.
On 27 and 28 November 2014, the Court heard argu-
ments from the parties as well as two Ogiek witnesses,
an expert witness and an intervention by MRG on
behalf of the Original Complainants.7 In March 2015,
4. CEMIRIDE, Minority Rights Group International & Ogiek Peoples
Development Programme (On Behalf Of The Ogiek Community) v.
Republic Of Kenya, Communication 381/09.
5. CEMIRIDE and OPDP are both NGOs registered in Kenya; OPDP works
specifically to promote and protect Ogiek culture, land, language, envi-
ronment and human rights.
6. See <http:// en. african -court. org/ images/ Cases/ Orders/ 006 -2012 -
ORDER_ _ of_ Provisional_ Measures -_ African_ Union_ v. _ Kenya. pdf>.
7. See paras. 14, 27 and 29 of Ogiek judgment.
the Court proposed that amicable settlement be investi-
gated, although this was ultimately unsuccessful.8 In
March 2016, the Court decided to proceed to judgment,
issuing its landmark ruling on 26 May 2017.
2 The Ogiek’s Key Arguments
In order to benefit from the substantial body of interna-
tional human rights law recognising indigenous peoples’
rights, the Ogiek argued first that they are an ‘indige-
nous people’, a status that would also entitle them to
benefit from provisions of the African Charter that pro-
tect collective rights. They substantiated this argument
by stating that the Ogiek have been living in the Mau
Forest since time immemorial and that their way of life
and survival is inextricably linked to the forest as their
ancestral land.9
The Ogiek argued that the failure of the Kenyan Gov-
ernment to recognise them as an indigenous community
denies them their right to communal ownership of their
traditionally owned lands. They claimed that the
encroachment by the Kenyan Government on Ogiek
property, without their consent and without adequate
compensation, as well as the inability of Kenyan law and
the refusal of the Kenyan courts to respect collective
ownership rights, does not comply with the appropriate
international laws on indigenous peoples’ rights, result-
ing in a violation of Article 14.10
The Ogiek alleged that they have suffered routine dis-
crimination at the hands of the Respondent State, and
the reasons for such difference in treatment cannot be
considered strictly proportionate to, or absolute necessa-
ry for, the aims being pursued. As a result, the laws that
permit this discrimination are in violation of Article 2 of
the African Charter.11
By evicting the Ogiek from their land, refusing the
Ogiek access to the Mau Forest and the religious sites
within it, and failing to demarcate or protect those sites,
the Ogiek argued, the Kenyan Government has inter-
fered with their ability to practise and worship as their
faith dictates in violation of Article 8.12
The Ogiek further alleged that the eviction of the Ogiek
from their ancestral land and the refusal to allow them
access to their cultural home resulted in a dispropor-
tionate interference by the Respondent State and a deni-
al of the Ogiek’s right to culture under Articles 17(2)
and (3) of the African Charter.13
The Ogiek argued that they have been denied use of the
natural resources on their ancestral land while the Ken-
yan Government has plundered them, without seeking
the consent or effective participation of the Ogiek, or
sharing the benefits. They claim a violation of Article
8. Ibid., paras. 31-39.
9. Ibid., para. 103.
10. Ibid., paras. 114-119.
11. Ibid., paras. 132 & 133.
12. Ibid., paras. 157-160.
13. Ibid., paras. 170-172.
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21(1) and, accordingly, pursuant to the provisions of
Article 21(2), the Ogiek are entitled to the lawful recov-
ery of their property as well as to adequate compensa-
tion for the losses they have suffered.14
The Ogiek further maintained that the critical failure of
the Respondent State to consult with or seek consent
from the Ogiek community about their shared cultural,
economic and social life within the Mau Forest resulted
in a violation of the Ogiek’s right to development under
Article 22.15
The Ogiek claimed that the Government of Kenya is
obliged under Article 1 to adopt legislative or other
measures to ensure the Ogiek’s rights are protected
under the African Charter. The Government’s failure in
this respect results in a violation of Article 1.16
Finally, the Ogiek alleged that the continued prohibition
of access to the Mau Forest’s resources by the Ogiek
prevents the sustainability of the Ogiek’s traditional
hunter-gatherer way of life, and, as such, violates the
Ogiek’s right to life under Article 4 of the African Char-
ter.17
3 The Kenyan Government’s
Response
In relation to the Ogiek’s claim that they are an indige-
nous people, the Government argued that the Ogiek are
not a distinct ethnic group but rather a mix of different
ethnic communities. During the public hearing, howev-
er, the Government admitted that the Ogiek constitute
an indigenous people of Kenya but claimed that the
Ogiek of today are different from those of the 1930s,
having transformed their way of life through time and
adapted themselves to modern life, and that they are
currently like all other Kenyans.18
Responding to the arguments on Article 14, the Gov-
ernment contended that the Ogiek are not the only tribe
indigenous to the Mau Forest and therefore cannot
claim exclusive ownership of it. It stated that title for all
forest in Kenya is vested in the State. It further argued
that the Mau Forest is a protected conservation area
upon which the Ogiek were encroaching and that the
Ogiek had been consulted and notified before every
eviction, which was carried out in accordance with the
law. Finally, it claimed that Kenya’s land laws recognise
community ownership of land and provide for mecha-
nisms by which communities can participate in forest
conservation and management.19
In relation to the Ogiek’s claims of discrimination under
Article 2, the Government submitted that this was base-
less and lacked evidence. It further claimed that, in any
14. Ibid., paras. 191-193.
15. Ibid., paras. 202-204.
16. Ibid., para. 212.
17. Ibid., para. 147-149.
18. Ibid., para. 104.
19. Ibid., paras. 120-121.
event, the alleged discrimination would be contrary to a
number of provisions of its Constitution.20
The Government contended in relation to Article 8 that
the Ogiek had failed to adduce evidence to show the
exact places where their religious sites are located. They
argued that the Ogiek had abandoned their religion as
they have converted to Christianity and that the reli-
gious practices of the Ogiek are a threat to law and
order, necessitating Government interference. They
further alleged that they are free to access the Mau For-
est, except at night, and are prohibited from carrying
out certain activities in the forest without a licence.21
The Government argued under Article 17(2) and (3)
that it has taken reasonable steps at the national and
international levels to ensure that the cultural rights of
indigenous peoples in Kenya are promoted, protected
and fulfilled, referring specifically to its ratification of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) as well as Consti-
tutional provisions. It stated that it has the responsibili-
ty to ensure a balance between cultural rights and envi-
ronmental conservation, and that Ogiek and other indig-
enous peoples’ cultural rights may include activities
such as hunting or fishing, which could have a negative
impact on the environment. The Government further
added that the Ogiek’s lifestyle has metamorphosed and
the cultural and traditional practices that made them
distinct no longer exist, and that, therefore, the group
no longer exists and cannot claim any cultural rights,
nor can they be said to conserve the environment.22
The Government denied a violation of the Ogiek’s
rights to freely dispose of their wealth and natural
resources, claiming that Article 21 of the African Char-
ter calls for reconciliation between the State, on the one
hand, and individuals or groups /communities, on the
other, when it comes to the ownership and control of
natural resources. They also argued that states ultimate-
ly exercise the enjoyment of this right in the interest of
the people and that efforts are being made to maintain a
balance between conservation, a people-centred
approach to the control of natural resources and their
ultimate control, with an emphasis on access to, rather
than ownership over, natural resources.23
In relation to the right to development under Article 22,
the Government argued that the Ogiek had not shown
how it had failed to undertake development initiatives
for their benefit, or how they had been discriminated
against within development processes. It further stated
that consultation had taken place with the Ogiek’s dem-
ocratically elected representatives in relation to develop-
ment of the Mau Forest.24
The Government did not address the Ogiek’s argu-
ments under Article 1 of the African Charter.25
20. Ibid., paras. 134-135.
21. Ibid., para. 161.
22. Ibid., paras. 173-175.
23. Ibid., para. 194.
24. Ibid., paras. 205-206.
25. Ibid., para. 213.
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With regard to the arguments under Article 4 of the
African Charter, the Government claimed that the Mau
Forest Complex is important for all Kenyans and that it
is entitled to develop it for the benefit of all its citizens.
It further argued that the effects of any economic activi-
ty on Kenya’s indigenous people should be seen in the
light of the principle of proportionality.26
4 Analysis of the Court’s
Judgment
Before addressing the merits of the Ogiek’s substantive
claims, the Court addressed various procedural aspects
of the case, responding to some preliminary objections
raised by the Government of Kenya. First, the Court
ruled that it has jurisdiction to hear the case following
the Commission’s referral, confirming and clarifying the
procedure under which cases can be referred to the
Court by the Commission.27 This included clarifying
that there was no need for the Commission to have first
brought the case to the attention of the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government of the African Union
before referring the case to the Court28 and that the sta-
tus of the Original Complainants before the Commis-
sion was irrelevant because the Commission – the
Applicant in the instant case – is entitled to submit cases
to the Court, pursuant to Article 5(1) of the Protocol
Establishing the Court.29 This is particularly important
for future Commission-referred cases, given this is the
first judgment to be delivered following a referral and a
substantive hearing on merits and admissibility.30 Sec-
ond, the Court held that even though the Government
only became a Party to the African Charter on 10 Feb-
ruary 1992 and a Party to the Protocol Establishing the
Court on 4 February 2004, the alleged violations related
to events that occurred before those dates but that were
continuing to take place and therefore the Court had the
power to consider the totality of the Ogiek’s claims.31
Finally, the Court considered various points regarding
whether or not the Court had the power to hear the
case, confirming that the Commission did not need to
have itself considered this issue before the case was
referred to the Court since the Court will make its own
separate determination once referred; that the case
before the Commission is no longer pending; and that
even though the Commission (the party before the
26. Ibid., para. 150.
27. Cases can be referred pursuant to Art. 5(1) of the Protocol Establishing
the Court.
28. Ogiek judgment, paras. 48-55
29. Ibid., paras. 56-61
30. The first Commission-referred Court case in which a judgment was
issued by the Court was African Commission on Human and Peoples’
Rights v. Libya, App. no. 002/2013, 3 June 2016, in which judgment
was issued in default and not after hearing both parties, available at:
<www. african -court. org/ en/ images/ Cases/ Judgment/ Judgment
%20Appl%20%20002 -2013%20African%20Commission%20v
%20Libya -%20Engl%20. pdf>.
31. Ogiek judgment, paras. 62-66.
Court) had not taken steps to exhaust domestic rem-
edies, the Ogiek had taken steps to do so, which the
Court was satisfied were unduly prolonged and there-
fore were not available to the Ogiek to exhaust. Again, as
the first Court judgment to be delivered following a
referral by the Commission and a substantive hearing on
merits and admissibility, this has provided important
procedural precedent for future Commission-referred
cases, as well as building on the Court’s jurisprudence
regarding its admissibility criteria.
Turning then to the alleged violations of the African
Charter, first, the Court dealt with the claim that the
Ogiek are an indigenous people. It specifically drew
inspiration32 from the Commission’s Working Group on
Indigenous Populations/Communities and the UN
Special Rapporteur on minority issues, concluding that
the relevant factors to consider when determining
whether a community is indigenous or not include the
priority in time with respect to the occupation and use
of a specific territory; a voluntary perception of cultural
distinctiveness, which may include aspects of language,
social organisation, and religion and spiritual values;
self-identification as well as recognition by other groups,
or by State authorities that they are a distinct collectivi-
ty; and an experience of subjugation, marginalisation,
dispossession, exclusion or discrimination, whether or
not these conditions persist. It further stated that these
criteria generally reflect the current normative standards
to identify indigenous populations in international law,
and deemed it appropriate, by virtue of Articles 60 and
61 of the Charter, to draw inspiration from other human
rights instruments to apply these criteria to the case
before it.33 The Court considered that it had received
significant evidence to affirm the Ogiek’s assertion that
the Mau Forest is their ancestral home,34 recognising
the link between indigenous populations and nature,
land and the natural environment, and that for centuries
they had depended on the Mau Forest as a source of
livelihood. The Court also found that the Ogiek exhibit
all aspects of the second factor, which include aspects of
language, social organisation, religious, cultural and spi-
ritual values, modes of production, laws and institutions
though self-identification and recognition by other
groups and by State authorities, as a distinct group.
Despite the fact that the Ogiek’ are divided into clans
made up of patrilineal languages each with its own name
and are of habitation, they have their own language,
social norms and forms of subsistence, which make
them distinct from other neighbouring tribes. They are
also identified as distinct by those tribes, with whom
they have regular interaction.35 Finally, the Court ruled
that the Ogiek have suffered continued subjugation and
marginalisation, as evidenced by the evictions from their
ancestral lands, their forced assimilation and lack of rec-
ognition of their status as a tribe. Accordingly, the
32. Pursuant to Arts. 60 and 61 of the Charter, para. 108.
33. Ogiek judgment, para. 108.
34. Ibid., para. 109.
35. Ibid., para. 110.
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Court recognised the Ogiek as an indigenous population
that is part of the Kenyan population and deserves spe-
cial protection deriving from their vulnerability.36
In relation to the right to property under Article 14, the
Court held that this can apply to groups or communi-
ties: that it can be individual or collective.37 Rather than
view the right to property in its classical conception, the
Court held that in order to determine the extent of the
rights recognised for indigenous communities in their
ancestral lands, Article 14 must be interpreted in the
light of Article 26 of the United Nations Declaration on
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which
recognises indigenous peoples’ ‘right to own, use, devel-
op and control the lands, territories and resources that
they possess by reason of traditional ownership.’38 This
provision places greater emphasis on the rights of pos-
session, occupation and use/utilisation of land. Since
the Government had not disputed that the Ogiek have
occupied lands in the Mau Forest since time immemori-
al, and since the Court had also held that the Ogiek con-
stitute an indigenous community, the Court ruled that
they have the right to occupy their ancestral lands, as
well as use and enjoy them.39 Further, the Court accep-
ted that the right to property under Article 14 can be
restricted in the public interest and where such restric-
tion is necessary and proportionate. However, it rejected
the Government’s public interest justification for evict-
ing the Ogiek from the Mau Forest – the preservation of
the natural ecosystem – since it had not provided any
evidence to the effect that the Ogiek’s continued pres-
ence in the area is the main cause of the depletion of the
natural environment. Varying reports revealed that the
main causes were government excisions for settlements
and ill-advised logging concessions, and indeed the
Government had conceded in its pleadings that the deg-
radation of the Mau Forest could not be associated
entirely with the Ogiek.40 Therefore, the continued
denial of access to and eviction from the Mau Forest of
the Ogiek population cannot be necessary or propor-
tionate to achieve the Government’s purported justifica-
tion. Accordingly, the Court held that the expulsion of
the Ogiek from their ancestral lands against their will,
without prior consultation and without respecting the
conditions of expulsion in the interest of public need,
constitutes a violation of Article 14.41
The Court next considered the Ogiek’s claims under
Article 2 of the African Charter. It first emphasised that
Article 2 is imperative for the respect and enjoyment of
all other rights and freedoms protected in the Charter,
and explained the relation between the right to non-dis-
crimination and the right to equality under Article 3.
The Court stated that ‘The scope of the right to non-
discrimination extends beyond the right to equal treat-
ment by the law and also has a practical dimension in
36. Ibid., para. 112.
37. Ibid., para. 123.
38. Ibid., para. 126.
39. Ibid., para. 128.
40. Ibid., paras. 129-130.
41. Ibid., para. 131.
that individuals should in fact be able to enjoy the rights
enshrined in the Charter without distinction of any kind
relating to their race, colour, sex, religion, political opin-
ion, national extraction or social origin, or any other sta-
tus.’42 In determining whether a ground falls under this
last category, the Court held that it shall take into
account the general spirit of the Charter. Further, the
Court drew attention to the difference between a dis-
tinction or differential treatment and discrimination,
explaining that ‘[a] distinction or differential treatment
becomes discrimination, and hence, contrary to Article
2, when it does not have objective or reasonable justifi-
cation and… where it is not necessary and proportion-
al’.43 Although not specifically referenced in the judg-
ment, the Court clearly drew upon regional standards in
reaching this conclusion, including the approach taken
by the European Court of Human Rights.44 In this
sense, the Court went much further in articulating the
right to non-discrimination under Article 2, and the rul-
ing therefore sets out a clear standard for the future.45
The Court moved on to consider the position of the
Ogiek in Kenya. It found that the Ogiek’s request for
recognition as a tribe goes back to the colonial period,
where their request was rejected by the then Kenya
Land Commission in 1933, and has been continuously
denied. In contrast, other groups in Kenya, such as the
Maasai, have been recognised as tribes and consequently
have been able to enjoy related rights derived from that
recognition – while the denial of the Ogiek’s request for
recognition has resulted in them being denied access to
their own land. The Court considered this treatment to
amount to a ‘distinction’ based on ethnicity and/or ‘oth-
er status’ and held that it therefore falls within the pro-
hibition on non-discrimination as specified in Article
2.46 Further, while the Court noted that Kenya’s 2010
Constitution recognises and accords special protection
to indigenous populations that could theoretically bene-
fit the Ogiek, these provisions can be effective only
when actually respected and have been available only
since the new Constitution was enacted in 2010. It
therefore found that the persisting eviction of the Ogiek,
and the failure to comply with decisions of the national
courts that protected them, demonstrates that the new
Constitution and the institutions that the Government
has set up to remedy past or ongoing justices are not
fully effective.47 Finally, again, the Court concluded
that Government’s purported justification that the evic-
42. Ibid., para. 138.
43. Ibid., para. 139.
44. See, e.g., case Relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of lan-
guages in education in Belgium, ECtHR judgment of 23 July 1968, App.
nos. 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63; 2126/64 , para
10; as referenced in para. 366 of the Applicant’s Submissions on the
Merits, available at: <http:// minorityrights. org/ wp -content/ uploads/
2015/ 03/ Final -MRG -merits -submissions -pdf. pdf>.
45. The Court has only found a violation of Art. 2 in one other case, Tanga-
nyika Law Society and Legal and Human Rights Centre and Reverend
Christopher R. Mtikila v. United Republic of Tanzania, Appl. Nos.
009&011/2011, judgment dated 14 June 2013.
46. Ogiek judgment, paras. 141-142.
47. Ibid., paras. 143-144.
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tion of the Ogiek were prompted by the need to pre-
serve the natural ecosystem of the Mau Forest could not
reasonably or objectively justify the lack of recognition
of the Ogiek’s indigenous or tribal status or the denial of
the rights associated with that status. This was particu-
larly true given the earlier finding in relation to Article
14 that the Mau Forest has been allocated to other peo-
ple in a manner that cannot be considered compatible
with the preservation of the natural environment.48
Accordingly, the Court found a violation of Article 2.
Considering the allegations under Article 8 of the Afri-
can Charter, the Court specified that the right to free-
dom of worship offers protection to all forms of beliefs
regardless of denominations, while the right to manifest
and practise religion includes the right to worship,
engage in rituals, observe days of rest, wear religious
garb, allow individuals or groups to worship or assemble
in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish
and maintain places for these purposes as well as to cele-
brate ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of
one’s own religion or belief. It drew inspiration, in par-
ticular, on international standards on the right to free
practice of religion, including Article 18 ICCPR, CCPR
General Comment no 22 on Article 18 ICCPR and Arti-
cle 6 of the UN Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief. The Court went on to note that, in
the context of traditional societies, where formal reli-
gious institutions often do not exist, the practice and
profession of religion are usually inextricably linked
with land and the environment, and any impediment to
accessing that environment severely constrains their
ability to conduct or engage in religious rituals.49 The
Court considered that the evictions of the Ogiek from
the Mau Forest were interfering with their freedom of
worship. While Article 8 allows restrictions on the exer-
cise of the freedom of religion and in the interest of
maintaining law and order, these restrictions must be
necessary and reasonable. The Court viewed that there
were other less onerous measures that the Government
could have put in place, such as collaborating to main-
tain the religious sites.50 Further, the Court noted that
not all Ogiek have converted to Christianity and that
there was significant evidence to show that they still
practise their traditional religious rites.51 It could not
therefore be said that the Ogiek’s traditional spiritual
values and rituals have been entirely eliminated. As a
result, given the link between indigenous populations
and their land for the purposes of practising their reli-
gion, the evictions of the Ogiek from the Mau Forest
rendered it impossible for the community to continue
their religious practices, resulting in an unjustifiable
interference with the Ogiek’s freedom of religion and a
violation of Article 8.52
48. Ibid., para. 145.
49. Ibid., para. 164.
50. Ibid., para. 167.
51. Ibid., para. 168.
52. Ibid., para. 169.
Addressing the Ogiek’s arguments under Article 17(2)
and (3) of the African Charter, the Court considered it
to have a dual dimension: ensuring the protection of
individuals’ participation in the cultural life of their
community while also obliging the State to promote and
protect traditional values of the community. It consid-
ered that the right goes beyond the duty not to destroy
or deliberately weaken minority groups, but requires
respect for, and protection of, cultural heritage essential
to the group’s identity, and should be construed in its
widest sense, encompassing the group’s total way of life:
languages, symbols, manner of constructing shelters,
economic activities, rituals (such as the group’s particu-
lar way of dealing with problems) and shared values that
reflect its distinctive character and personality.53 The
Court noted that preservation of culture is of particular
importance for indigenous populations, who have often
been affected by economic activities of other dominant
groups and large-scale developmental programmes and
drew on the work of the Commission’s Working Group
on Indigenous Populations/Communities, which recog-
nises that such communities have been the target of
deliberate policies of exclusion and forced assimilation,
threatening and extinguishing their cultural distinctive-
ness. It also referred to Article 8 of the UNDRIP, which
provides the right not to be subjected to forced assimila-
tion or destruction of their culture, and requires States
to provide effective mechanisms to prevent any action
that deprives them of their integrity as distinct peoples
or of their cultural values or ethnic identities. Similarly,
it relied on General Comment No 21 of the UN Com-
mittee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which
has observed that indigenous peoples’ cultural life is
indispensable to their existence, well-being and full
development, and includes the right to lands, territories
and resources that they have traditionally owned, occu-
pied or otherwise used or acquired.54 This approach of
recognising the duality of indigenous peoples’ rights to
participating in the cultural, social and political life of
society while also maintaining their own separate cultur-
al systems is very much in line with the spirit of
UNDRIP, particularly Articles 11, 12 and 13. The
Court considered that it had sufficient evidence demon-
strating the Ogiek have their own distinct culture distin-
guishing them from other communities living around
and outside the Mau Forest Complex, and considered
that the restrictions on access to and evictions from the
Mau Forest have greatly affected their ability to pre-
serve their traditions, resulting in a violation of the
Ogiek’s right to culture.55
Having found this, the Court then needed to determine
whether such interference could be justified by the need
to attain a legitimate aim under the African Charter.
The Court did not consider that the Ogiek’s way of life
has changed over time to the extent that it has elimina-
ted their cultural distinctiveness, and viewed that the
53. Ibid., paras. 177-179.
54. Ibid., paras. 180-181.
55. Ibid., para. 183.
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invisible traditional values embedded in their self-iden-
tification and shared mentality often remain unchanged.
Indeed, the Court could see that some of these changes
were caused by the Government as a result of restric-
tions on their right to access their land and natural envi-
ronment.56 This approach should be widely welcomed,
since it avoids the debate around whether indigenous
peoples still practise their traditional culture and com-
pletely dismisses any requirement to prove ‘cultural
authenticity’ in order for any indigenous people to be
able to claim their cultural rights. Finally, given that the
Court had already found that the Government had not
adequately proved its claim that the eviction of the
Ogiek was for the preservation of the natural ecosystem
of the Mau Forest, it held that this could not constitute
a legitimate justification for the interference in the
Ogiek’s exercise of their cultural rights under Article
17(2) and (3) of the African Charter.57
In relation to the Ogiek’s right to freely dispose of their
wealth and natural resources under Article 21, the Court
first considered whether these rights could be extended
from constituent peoples to sub-state ethnic groups and
communities that are a part of the State’s population. It
concluded that they could, provided such groups or
communities do not call into question the sovereignty or
territorial integrity of the State without consent.58 It
reached this decision by finding that it would be diffi-
cult for the Charter to automatically recognise the eth-
nic groups’ and communities’ right to self-determina-
tion and independence guaranteed under Article 20(1)
of the Charter, which would amount to a veritable right
to secession, but nothing prevents other peoples’ rights
from being recognised, where necessary, specifically for
the ethnic groups and communities that constitute the
population of a state. The Court’s reasoning clearly rec-
ognises that self-determination goes beyond secession,
which is important in the African context, given claims
often voiced by African states – and particularly during
the UNDRIP draft process – that to grant indigenous
peoples their self-determination threatens territorial
integrity. The Court then referred back to its earlier
findings in relation to the Ogiek’s right to property,
including their right to use and enjoy the produce of the
land, which presupposes the right to access and occupa-
tion of the land, and declared a violation of Article 21
since the Ogiek have been deprived of the right to enjoy
their ancestral lands.59
Regarding the claimed violation of the Ogiek’s right to
development, the Court reiterated its view on the defi-
nition of ‘peoples’ as already developed under Article 21
of the African Charter, stating that all populations that
comprise a constitutive element of a State are entitled to
social, economic and cultural development under Article
22 of the African Charter. Accordingly, the Ogiek popu-
lation is entitled, under Article 22, to enjoy their right to
56. Ibid., paras. 184-186.
57. Ibid., paras. 187-190.
58. Ibid., paras. 196-199.
59. Ibid., para. 201.
development.60 The Court again relied on UNDRIP,
citing Article 23, which states, ‘indigenous peoples have
the right to be actively involved in developing and
determining health, housing and other economic and
social programmes affecting them and…to administer
such programmes through their own institutions.’ Since
the Ogiek have been continuously evicted from the
Mau, without being effectively consulted, adversely
impacting on their economic, social and cultural devel-
opment; and since they have not been actively involved
in developing and determining programmes affecting
them, the Court held that the Government had violated
Article 22 of the African Charter.61
With regard to Article 1, the Court observed that this
imposes a duty on states to take all legislative and other
measures necessary to give effect to the rights and free-
doms guaranteed in the African Charter. It also
observed that Kenya’s 2010 Constitution and other 2016
legislation regarding community and forest lands had
made some progress in this respect – but noted that
these laws had been enacted relatively recently. The
Court stated that it had already found the Government
had failed to recognise the Ogiek as a distinct tribe,
leading to denial of access to their land and the conse-
quential violations of their rights under Articles 2, 8, 14,
17(2) and (3), 21 and 22 of the African Charter. The
Government had not demonstrated that it had taken
measures to give effect to these rights. Therefore, the
Court found a violation of Article 1.62
Finally, in relation to the alleged violation of the right to
life under Article 4 of the African Charter, the Court
noted that this is a right to be enjoyed irrespective of the
group to which he or she belongs. The Court also
understood that the violation of economic, social and
cultural rights, including through forced evictions, may
generally engender conditions unfavourable to a decent
life. However, the Court viewed that a deprivation of
economic, social and cultural rights may not necessarily
result in a violation of the right to life under Article 4 of
the African Charter, finding it necessary to make a dis-
tinction between the classical meaning of the right to life
and the right to decent existence of a group. Concluding
that Article 4 relates to the physical right to life, rather
than to existence, and that no causal link had been
established between the evictions of the Ogiek and the
deaths that had occurred subsequent to their evictions,
it found there had been no violation of Article 4. The
Court’s approach in this respect differs markedly from
the stance adopted in Inter-American jurisprudence,
which has incorporating aspects of indigenous commu-
nity’s livelihood – including the possibility of access to
traditional means of subsistence, to use and enjoyment
of the natural resources necessary to obtain clean water
and to practise traditional medicine to prevent and cure
illnesses – within the right to life and human dignity.63
60. Ibid., para. 208.
61. Ibid., paras. 209-211.
62. Ibid., paras. 214-217.
63. See, e.g., I/A Court H.R.,Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Para-
guay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of 17 June 2005. Series
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5 Remedies and Reparations
In their legal submissions to the Court, the Ogiek
sought a declaration that the Mau Forest is the ancestral
home of the Ogiek in which they have a communal
property right and that they are entitled to full repara-
tions for the violations suffered. They requested a sepa-
rate judgment of the Court,64 including the following
orders: restitution of Ogiek ancestral land; compensa-
tion for all the damage suffered; the adoption of legisla-
tive and other measures ensuring the Ogiek’s right to be
effectively consulted; the issuance of a full apology to
the Ogiek; the erection of a public monument acknowl-
edging the violation of Ogiek rights; and full recognition
of the Ogiek as an indigenous people of Kenya. The
Court decided that it would rule on reparations in a sep-
arate decision, taking into consideration additional sub-
missions from the Ogiek and the Government of Kenya,
and granting each party a period of 90 days in which to
provide its submissions.65 At the time of writing, this
period is ongoing and the Court’s reparations order is
hoped for 2018.
The Government was also ordered to take all appropri-
ate measures within a reasonable time frame to remedy
all the violations established and to inform the Court of
the measures taken within 6 months of the date of the
judgment.66
6 A Model for Community
Engagement?
Litigating the Ogiek case on behalf of such a large com-
munity, who had been systematically discriminated,
marginalised and disenfranchised by successive govern-
ments since the 1900s, who had lost faith in the ability
of any justice system to offer them redress, and who live
in scattered geographical locations, represented numer-
ous challenges for the Original Complainants. Yet, as
will be explained, these challenges also offered signifi-
cant opportunities to provide the Ogiek with legal
empowerment.
First, there was a need to establish the historical rela-
tionship that the Ogiek have had with their ancestral
land in the Mau Forest since time immemorial. The
complicated factual matrix of evictions and treatment of
the Ogiek over the years also needed to be clearly
detailed and evidenced. Both of these processes required
C No. 125; I/A Court H.R., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v.
Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of March 29, 2006.
Series C No. 146; I/A Court H.R., Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Communi-
ty v. Paraguay Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment Merits and rep-
arations. Judgment of 24 August 2010. Series C No. 214.
64. Pursuant to Rule 63 of the Court rules.
65. Ibid., paras. 222-223 and 227 Merits (iv) and (v); note that para. 227
(v) provides a period of 60 days, but at the hearing during which the
judgment was delivered, a period of 90 days was requested by both
parties and granted by the Court.
66. Ogiek judgment, para. 227, Merits (iii).
vast documentation and anthropological research, with-
in social science libraries, in Kenya’s national archives as
well as online research. There was also a detailed evi-
dence gathering process conducted by MRG and
OPDP, in order to unearth relevant documents proving
ownership, such as maps, correspondence with local and
national authorities dating back many years, pleadings
and related evidence in the numerous land disputes
brought by the Ogiek before the national courts. Simi-
larly, extensive witness statements were collected from
Ogiek community members, including elders, women
and youth, in order to substantiate not just the evictions
that were suffered, but also to fully explain the Ogiek’s
relationship with the Mau Forest, its central function in
the conduct of customary religious and cultural practi-
ces, the crucial part it plays as a source of food and tra-
ditional medicine, and, above all, its vital role in defin-
ing Ogiek identity. Detailed witness evidence was also
collected on Ogiek identity and traditional lifestyle,
including hunting, honey production, traditional medi-
cines and other traditional uses for plants, cultural rit-
uals and ceremonies, crafts, use of territory, social
organisation, language, religion, tribal interactions, as
well as the extent to which that lifestyle has been forced
to change over the years.
In addition to considerable research on matters of inter-
national comparative law, MRG’s legal team also needed
to establish the role of Ogiek as conservationists of the
Mau Forest. Photos of indigenous plants well known to
the Ogiek and the role that these play in Ogiek customs
were collected and submitted to the Court, demonstrat-
ing Ogiek traditional knowledge and their keen aware-
ness of how to conserve their ancestral surroundings.
OPDP and MRG also produced a film of Ogiek land
and cultural practices, which was submitted as video
evidence to the Court, giving the judges the opportunity
to witness firsthand the traditional Ogiek way of life. An
expert on customary land tenure also presented critical
written and oral evidence to the Court on the way that
the practice of indigenous communities can and does
save threatened natural forests.
As a result of this detailed and lengthy process of evi-
dence gathering to support the litigation process, the
Ogiek have been considerably legally empowered. Legal
empowerment involves strengthening the capacity of all
people to exercise their rights, either as individuals or as
members of a community. It aims to deliver grassroots
justice, ensuring that law is not confined to books or
courtrooms, but rather is available and meaningful to
everyone.67 Through significant engagement with the
community – which was not only necessary to ensure
67. See, e.g., <https:// www. opensocietyfoundations. org/ projects/ legal -
empowerment> and <https:// namati. org/ >; see also UN Commission
on the Legal Empowerment of the Poor, 2008, ‘The Four Pillars of Legal
Empowerment’, in Making the Law Work for Everyone Volume I, Com-
mission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor and United Nations Devel-
opment Programme, New York, pp. 25-42, which identifies ways of
empowering those in poverty, focusing around access to justice and the
rule of law, property rights, labour rights and business rights (the latter
two were less explored in the case of the Ogiek).
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the success of the litigation efforts, but also part of a
conscious effort by the Original Complainants – the
Ogiek have become familiarised with their human rights
under both national and international law, have been
enabled to advocate for full protection of those rights,
and better understand the judicial process. These
approaches also had the effect of uniting the Ogiek
behind – and in spite of – a long, protracted, uncertain
legal struggle. This was particularly important for a
community as vulnerable as the Ogiek, some of whom
were also being intimidated and harassed: it would have
been relatively easy for the Government to have sought
support for their own position had the Ogiek not been
firmly committed to the case.
Working closely with MRG, OPDP went to great
lengths to ensure that Ogiek community members were
closely consulted as the litigation developed and were
kept fully informed of procedural and other develop-
ments, via community forums, through consultative
meetings with Ogiek elders and community representa-
tives, and through regular informal outreach and liaison.
This was particularly important during amicable settle-
ment discussions, as Ogiek views on both the course of
action and the settlement terms were necessarily central
to the process. Several Ogiek community members also
gave oral evidence direct to the Court during the
November 2014 hearing, providing powerful testimony
that played a pivotal role in assisting the judges to deliv-
er their ruling. In addition, MRG and OPDP facilitated
over 50 Ogiek to attend the hearing and over 80 to
attend the judgment delivery, giving the Ogiek a clear
sense of ownership over their case, which was being
decided by a Court sitting in a different country and by
judges from many different states. Many Ogiek com-
munity members also attended meetings with Commis-
sioners and representatives of the Commission team
representing them before the Court, in order to ensure
that their voices were heard.
In addition, MRG and OPDP also trained 25 Ogiek
community members as paralegals, through a series of
in-depth and follow-up refresher sessions. This enabled
the Ogiek not only to have a better understanding of
their rights under national, regional and international
law, and the national judicial system, but also to chal-
lenge instances of intimidation, violence and harassment
that resulted following efforts to defend themselves
from ongoing evictions, by bringing cases before domes-
tic courts and recording and collecting evidence that
could be used within the regional case. The training also
equipped them with skills to monitor the Court’s 2013
Provisional Measures Order, submitting vital evidence
of violations of the Order to OPDP and MRG that
could then be forwarded to the Court. These will be
essential competencies necessary as the implementation
process commences in order that the Ogiek monitor the
extent to which the Kenyan Government complies with
the judgment; but, as explained further below, resources
will still be needed to continue the outreach as imple-
mentation begins and to enable them to conduct nation-
al and local advocacy, giving the Ogiek a sense of owner-
ship over their own destiny.
7 Evaluating the Role of
Litigation in Community
Empowerment
The Ogiek judgment was delivered while MRG was
conducting a detailed external evaluation of its litigation
and legal empowerment programmes implemented with
minorities and indigenous peoples in East Africa over
the last 15 years, including the Ogiek case. The evalua-
tion found that litigation and legal empowerment are
powerful tools that create spaces and opportunities for
communities to unite around shared struggles and make
decisions that can impact positively on their collective
rights,68 while also recommending further strategies to
be employed at the national and domestic levels.
First, the Ogiek sought via litigation to find solutions to
deeply historically embedded land disputes. In doing so,
they were able to draw on the experiences of other com-
munities in Kenya and East Africa, as well as interna-
tionally, that have also resorted to litigation. The social
and political climate in these states has been extremely
resistant to recognising indigenous peoples’ land rights
in accordance with international law. These common
contexts allowed for cross-fertilisation of human rights
standards and provided a strong platform for communi-
ty-led litigation strategies.
In the course of the litigation processes, the evaluators
observed significant and positive social changes, includ-
ing the enhancement of communities’ sense of justice,
legal empowerment and unity around long-term strug-
gles.69 A certain degree of positive change in attitudes
and behaviours of other parts of society, such as neigh-
bouring communities, local authorities and the media,
was also reported as a consequence of the legal and
human rights activities and litigation, although this state
of affairs remains fragile, given they are not supported
by material and legal changes. However, some concerns
were expressed by communities that litigation can con-
tribute to the inflammation of existing tensions and
surges of violence where the socio-political climate is
unstable. For example, Ogiek claiming their rights over
their ancestral land caused tension with other non-
Ogiek communities, who used intimidation and, in some
cases, violence, to prevent them from doing so. Respon-
sible action is necessary and a litigation programme
operating in such circumstances must be supplemented
with security screening measures and risk assessments
68. See <http:// minorityrights. org/ programmes -evaluations/ indigenous -
peoples -land -rights -tanzania -kenya -impact -strategic -litigation -legal -
empowerment/ for a copy of the report in full>.
69. The Ogiek’s immediate sense of justice upon receiving a positive ruling
in their favour can clearly be witnessed in a short film, available at:
<http:// minorityrights. org/ law -and -legal -cases/ the -ogiek -case/ >.
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for the prevention of violence, as well as access to fund-
ing and remedies in case of violence.
Further, now that the regional human rights system has
ruled in favour of the Ogiek and ordered land restitu-
tion, demarcation and titling, a strong plan to support
implementation and actual material gain for the com-
munities is necessary. In terms of redress and material
consequences, winning these regional legal cases is the
start of a process. For the Ogiek, the material conse-
quences of litigation so far have been minimal, and
implementation will be a great challenge. The prospects
of effective implementation can be stalled by a lack of
access to long-term financial support and human
resources for national and international NGOs, as well
as for human rights mechanisms and governmental bod-
ies responsible for implementation, so adequate support
on that front is essential. However, a strong and well-
resourced implementation programme, incorporating
international regional, national and advocacy, mapping
of community land, regular community outreach meet-
ings and trainings, appropriate use of the media and
focusing on the needs of women, youth and elders, can
be effective at uniting a community behind a common
cause.
However, the impact of strategic litigation on the
national legal framework of Kenya is not straightfor-
ward. While legal empowerment of communities is
undeniable, the judiciary in Kenya and Tanzania have
not yet taken on board international law on indigenous
peoples’ rights. For example, training of judges, regis-
trars and lawyers in Tanzania shows the importance of
such activities in raising the awareness of decision-mak-
ers about indigenous peoples’ rights in Africa and inter-
nationally. Litigation is part of a larger advocacy strat-
egy aiming at making national laws and the legal profes-
sion more conversant with indigenous peoples’ rights as
per international law. From this perspective, litigation is
a powerful tool for change, but the impact of the Ogiek
litigation seems to have been felt mainly at the commun-
ity, regional and international levels, where the contri-
bution of indigenous peoples’ organisations in Kenya
and of MRG to the regional jurisprudence on land
rights in Africa has been found to be considerable. Fur-
ther legal empowerment work clearly needs to be done
at the national level in order to achieve change on the
ground and secure implementation of the Ogiek judg-
ment.
8 A Wider Impact beyond
Kenya?
The Court’s landmark judgment is a momentous ach-
ievement that offers hope to other indigenous and rural
communities across Africa, and beyond. The Court has
firmly embraced and adopted the concept of indigenous
peoples’ rights, in relation to not only communal prop-
erty rights over ancestral land, but also rights to culture
and religion, and also their right to freely enjoy their
natural resources. By specifically drawing inspiration
from the concept of indigenous peoples as set out in
UNDRIP, as well as stating that such people deserve
special protection deriving from their vulnerability, it
sends a clear message to governments across the conti-
nent that indigenous peoples must be recognised and
can no longer be routinely discriminated and marginal-
ised. The Court also made some very clear rulings in
relation to the role of indigenous peoples, and specifical-
ly hunter-gatherers, in conservation. It stated in no
uncertain terms that the preservation of the forest could
not justify the lack of recognition of the Ogiek’s indige-
nous or tribal status or the denial of the rights associated
with that status, and explicitly confirmed that the Ogiek
could not be held responsible for the depletion of the
Mau Forest, nor could it justify their eviction or the
denial of access to their land to exercise their right to
culture.
The Ogiek case has also demonstrated that litigation and
related legal empowerment efforts can significantly
build and increase community cohesion. Not only can
they provide the driving force behind community unity,
but when organised, communities like the Ogiek are in a
strong position to strengthen and support that litigation,
seek their rights as both individuals and as a collective,
and advocate for implementation of judgments when
successful. As the Ogiek await a further Court ruling on
reparations, which is hoped for 2018, many will be mon-
itoring whether the Kenyan Government respects the
judgment. Needless to say, the Ogiek will be at the fore-
front.
66
ELR April 2018 | No. 1 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000095
